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Abstract
We examine the eﬀect of the number of candidates and the impact of ideology on the
eﬃciency of the electoral process. We show that the tendency to focus on policies that
provide particularistic beneﬁts increases with the number of candidates to the expense of
policies that beneﬁt the population at large. Thus, the eﬃciency of policies provided in
an electoral equilibrium worsens when the number of candidates increases.
We next show that partisan voters are disadvantaged in the process of redistributive
politics, and that the larger the fraction of voters who vote ideologically, the less eﬃcient
the political process. This is because electoral competition focuses on swing voters,
increasing the values of policies with targetable beneﬁts.
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11 Introduction
This paper has two goals. First, we examine the eﬀect of the number of candidates on the
eﬃciency of the electoral process. Second, we investigate the eﬀect of ideology on eﬃciency
and on redistributive politics in a model with more than two candidates.
In most democratic political systems, electoral competition takes place between more
than two parties. Whether a large number of parties is desirable is subject to debate (see,
for instance, Lijphart (1984)). One view is that, in societies that are divided along many
ethnic, religious, and ideological lines, multi-party systems are beneﬁcial because they allow
a more diverse representation. A diﬀerent view is that multi-party systems suﬀer from “inde-
cisiveness”, i.e., an inability to reach important decisions that comes from the post-electoral
bargaining among coalitions. Moreover, multi-party systems are viewed as suﬀering from
cabinet instability.
We provide a complementary perspective, that abstracts from issues of ideological divi-
sions and post-electoral politics, to focus on the following simple idea. When there are many
parties, each party tries to please a narrow constituency, ignoring the majority of the elec-
torate. Thus, the larger the number of parties, the greater the appeal of particularistic (or
pork-barrel) projects that can easily be targeted to subsets of the electorate. Instead, policies
that beneﬁt the population at large may be provided less eﬀectively than when there are few
parties. Thus, this tradeoﬀ between targetability and eﬃciency worsens with the number of
parties.
This viewpoint aﬀords a natural perspective on the eﬃciency of electoral competition
that is absent in the views described above. We analyze a model of redistributive politics
with N candidates, and study how the equilibrium policy outcomes depend on the number
of candidates. This gives insights into the eﬀects of the number of parties on the eﬃciency
of electoral competition, in the spirit of the results on the eﬀect of the number of ﬁrms in
economic markets.
We build on Lizzeri-Persico (1998), where there are only two candidates who compete
for oﬃce by making a (binding) electoral promise to each voter. Candidates only care about
the outcome of the election. Voters are homogeneous: each voter will vote for the candidate
promising him the most utility. Candidates have a budget of one dollar per voter and are faced
with only two possible choices: investing all the money in the public good, or redistributing
the money. In the ﬁrst case all voters get utility G (in money units). If G > 1 eﬃciency
requires that the public good be provided. Money (local public goods, pork-barrel projects),
however, can be targeted to subsets of voters. Even when eﬃciency requires provision of
the public good, it may not be an equilibrium for candidates to do so; when G < 2, oﬀering
transfers of more than G to 51 percent of the voters is feasible, and is a superior strategy if the
opponent promises the public good. Thus, the incentives towards tactical redistribution lead
to under-provision of the public good; the equilibrium is ineﬃcient whenever 1 < G < 2.
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Eﬃciency in this model is given by the probability that the public good is provided in
equilibrium. With two candidates in a proportional system, this is the solid line in Figure ??
(see Lizzeri and Persico (1998)).
In this model, the public good is underprovided. This is in contrast with the classic
analysis of the ineﬃciency of provision of public goods in democracies (see for instance Stiglitz
(1988)) which relies on the contrast between the policy preferred by the median voter and the
Samuelsonian optimum. The incentives toward tactical redistribution which underlies some
of the results in the present paper, cannot be adequately discussed by using median voter
style models that rely on (exogenous) restrictions on the dimension of the policy space, such
as linear taxes.
The present paper analyzes the case where there are N candidates. We show that in-
creasing the number of candidates leads to worse outcomes: the provision of public goods
is less eﬃcient when the number of candidates is increased. The intuition is the following.
Suppose that all candidates oﬀer the public good. Then, they receive an equal share of 1/N
of the vote. Now, if G < N, oﬀering transfers of more than G to more than 1/N of the voters
is feasible, and is a superior strategy. Thus, equilibrium is ineﬃcient for 1 < G < N. The
value of the targetability of transfers becomes more important as the number of candidates
increases. Consider for example the case of three candidates. In Section 4 we show that,
at the equilibrium with equal treatment, the probability that the public good is provided is
given by the dashed line in Figure ??.
3Next, we introduce an ideological dimension in voters’ preferences: we allow for the
possibility that some voters are partisans in the sense that they tend to favor one candidate.
We show that partisan voters tend to be disadvantaged in the process of redistributive politics.
This is because partisan voters are less responsive to transfers, and so competition for those
voters is less intense. This feature of our model parallels a ﬁnding by Lindbeck and Weibull
(1987), who obtain a similar result in a model with two candidates. One advantage of our
model is that it remains tractable when we consider more than two candidates.
Ideological biases are a new source of ineﬃciency in our model. We show that even if
these ideological preferences have no economic dimension, there is an impact on the eﬃciency
of policy making that results from electoral competition. This is due to the fact that electoral
competition focuses on swing voters, creating an even stronger incentive for candidates to
provide pliable policies targeted to these voters, instead of a public good whose services
beneﬁt swing and partisan voters equally. This leads to lower provision of the public good,
relative to the case where voters have no ideological bias.
The main body of our analysis concentrates on the (unique) equilibrium with equal ex-
ante treatment of voters. When there are more than two candidates, a new phenomenon
emerges: equilibrium coordination by candidates on particular sets of voters. Each candidate
chooses to focus its attention on a particular set of voters and ignore other voters. This
is despite the fact that voters are ex-ante identical from the perspective of each candidate.
Thus, there are equilibria where candidates cater to diﬀerent groups of voters. We call this
phenomenon “fragmented competition.”
The intuition is the following. Suppose that there are three candidates. Each set of voters
is courted by a pair of candidates and ignored by other candidates. The reason it pays for
candidate 1 to ignore voters who are courted by candidates 2 and 3 is that attracting these
voters is too costly; candidate 1 would have to outbid both other candidates. In contrast,
the voters he focuses on are courted by only one other candidate, and hence are attracted
more cheaply. In Section 6 we show that, at the equilibrium with fragmented competition,
the probability that the public good is provided is given by the dotted line in Figure ??. The
ineﬃciency of the electoral process becomes more pronounced relative to the case of equal
treatment. The reason is that now the value of targeting is even greater, since candidates
want to be able to focus their promises on a pre-speciﬁed subsection of the population.
1.1 Related Literature
The idea of the tradeoﬀ between policies with diﬀuse beneﬁts and pork-barrel projects has
long been present in the mainstream political science literature; a comprehensive survey of
the literature is in Persson and Tabellini (1998). Most of the literature on the ineﬃciency of
4democracy focuses on decision making in legislatures.1 For instance, Baron (1991) models
the legislative process via a sequential bargaining model. These models analyze speciﬁc, very
structured legislative processes; they do not address candidates competing in large elections.
In Chari et al. (1997), policy is determined through bargaining between a president and
local representatives. This gives rise to a common pool problem whereby an excessive number
of local public projects are ﬁnanced from general taxation (see also Weingast et al.(1981)).
Similarly, Persson et al. (1997) compare congressional and parliamentary systems. In their
model, the politician choosing the level of public good provision has the option of foregoing
the public good and appropriating the money for his own district; again, a common pool
problem arises. Our setup diﬀers from these models since we focus on national candidates
who do not represent any speciﬁc district: when proposing to increase transfers to a district,
our candidates take into account the loss of another district. Thus, nationwide candidates
mitigate the common pool problem by internalizing, in part, the costs of providing pork-barrel
projects.
The eﬀect of the number of candidates on political competition has been extensively
explored in the setting of spatial competition (see, for instance, Palfrey (1984), Austen-
Smith and Banks (1988)). The spatial model is not naturally suited to discuss eﬃciency
(no two points in the policy space are Pareto-comparable). For an excellent review of this
strand of the literature, see Shepsle (1991). Besley and Coate (1997) and Osborne and
Slivinski (1996) provide a diﬀerent model of multi-candidate elections with endogenous entry
by citizen-candidates who have policy preferences and do not commit to electoral platforms.
Myerson (1993) deals with redistributive issues, and compares electoral systems in terms
of the inequality of redistribution. Our paper borrows the model of redistribution from
Myerson, and adds a public good. This introduces an eﬃciency dimension, which is absent
in Myerson’s paper.
Besley and Coate (1998) discuss the eﬃciency of representative democracy where can-
didates are citizens who, if elected, implement their favorite policies. Theirs is a model of
repeated elections, and the ineﬃciency depends on the dynamic nature of the model.
Persson and Tabellini (1999) discuss a two-candidates model related to Lizzeri and Persico
(1998) and also provide some empirical evidence on the provision of public goods in diﬀerent
political systems. As they point out, there was no model addressing the provision of public
goods under multi-candidate competition. Our paper provides such a model.
Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly (1999) discuss the provision of public goods in relation to
ethnic divisions. Their analysis of U.S. local public goods shows that the shares of spending
on public goods is inversely related to ethnic fragmentation. To explain this phenomenon,
they provide a model of two-stage budgeting procedure, where ﬁrst voting takes place on the
1An exception is Coate and Morris (1995), who focus on the fact that politicians have private information
on the eﬀects of government policy.
5size of the budget, and in a second stage on its composition. Our model of Section 5 provides
an alternative explanation for this phenomenon.
2 Model
2.1 Economy and Agents
There are N candidates. There is a continuum of voters with measure one. The set of voters
is denoted by V .2 There are two goods, money and a public good. The public good can only
be produced by using all the money in the economy.
Each voter has an endowment of one unit of money. The public good yields a utility
of G to each voter. Voters have no a priori preference for either candidate, and have linear
utility over goods.
Candidates make binding promises to each voter. A candidate can oﬀer to provide the
public good (to all voters); alternatively, he can oﬀer diﬀerent taxes and transfers to diﬀerent
voters. Each voter votes for the candidate who promises her the greatest utility. Candidates
maximize their expected vote share. This assumption on candidates’ objective can be inter-
preted as describing a proportional system where the spoils of oﬃce (seats in an assembly)
are divided proportionally to the share of the vote.
2.2 Game
A pure strategy for a candidate speciﬁes whether he chooses to oﬀer the public good or
transfers (he cannot oﬀer both). In the event he chooses transfers, a pure strategy speciﬁes a
promise of a transfer to each voter. Formally, a pure strategy is a function Φ : V → [0,+∞),
where Φ(v) represents the consumption promised to voter v. The function Φ satisﬁes one of
two conditions: either Φ(v) = G for all v’s, signifying that the candidate oﬀers the public
good; or,
R
V Φ(v)dv = 1, which is the balanced budget condition when a candidate oﬀers
transfers. In the latter case, Φ(v)−1represents the transfer (or tax, if negative) promised to
voter v.
There are two stages of the game:
Stage 1 Candidates choose oﬀers to voters simultaneously and independently.
Stage 2 Each voter v gets oﬀers (Φ1(v),...,ΦN(v)) from candidates. After observing
the oﬀers, voter v votes for candidate i if, for all j 6= i, Φi(v) > Φj(v). Ties are resolved by
randomizing with equal probability.
2The assumption of inﬁnitely many voters is useful because it allows us to invoke the law of large numbers
on a number of occasions. This is meant to be an approximation for a game with a large (but ﬁnite) number
of voters.
6Voters’ behavior can be made fully consistent with the usual rationality assumptions
(strategic voting). Assume that the probability that the policy proposed by any given can-
didate is implemented is equal to this candidate’s share of the vote; then, it is a dominant
strategy for a voter to vote for the candidate who proposes the policy that is best for him.
This interpretation of policy implementation is the one that we will adopt when computing
the probability of provision of the public good in Theorems 2 and 6.
For values of G smaller than N there is no equilibrium in pure strategies. Consider for
instance the case of two candidates. Suppose candidate 1’s strategy was Φ1. If Φ1(v) = G for
all v, i.e. candidate 1 promises each voter the public good, then candidate 2 can choose to
promise more than G to more than 50 percent of the voters and obtain more than 50 percent
of the votes. This is impossible in equilibrium. Suppose then that candidate 1 chooses to
oﬀer money. Now candidate 2 could take a set of voters V1 with small positive measure such
that Φ1(v) > 0 for v ∈ V1, oﬀer zero to these voters and use the saved money to ﬁnance oﬀers
of Φ1(v)+ to all other voters. The set V1 and the  can be chosen so that candidate 2 wins
with a share of the vote arbitrarily close to one hundred percent. Thus, at equilibrium both
candidates will be employing mixed strategies.
A mixed strategy in this game could be a very complicated object, since the space of pure
strategies is large. We discuss the case where Φi(v), the oﬀer made by candidate i to voter v,
is a realization from a random variable with c.d.f. Fv
i : <+ → [0,1].3 Note that, even when
candidates use mixed strategies, each voter observes her realized promises before voting, not
random variables.
It turns out that we only need to look at “simple” strategies of the following form:
candidate i chooses to promise the public good with probability βi and promise money with
probability 1 − βi. We show that there are two types of equilibria, corresponding to the
way that candidates redistribute money. One type of equilibrium displays (ex-ante) equal
treatment: candidates draw promises to all voters from the same Fi (notice the absence of
the superscript v).4 The empirical distribution of transfers by candidate i to voters is Fi;
hence, Fi(x) is the fraction of supporters who receive promises below x from candidate i. By
manipulating Fi, candidate i is able to target transfers to sections of the electorate. We want
to stress that there is a natural interpretation for these mixed strategies: choosing F should
be thought of as choosing the Lorenz curve, i.e. the empirical distribution of transfers, in the
population.
In the equilibrium with fragmented competition, candidates partition the set of voters
into two groups: one where voters get nothing (they are fully expropriated), the other where
their oﬀers are drawn from the same c.d.f. Fi : < → [0,1].
3We rule out correlation between oﬀers to diﬀerent voters.
4Of course, the fact that oﬀers are realizations of the same random variable does not mean that each voter
gets the same oﬀer.
73 The Linearity of Returns to Transfers
In this section, we consider the case of equal (ex ante) treatment. We show that in equilibrium,
candidates choose transfers from the set [0,k] ∪ (G,N], for some positive k < G. The
probability of winning a voter with a promise of x on this set is shown to be x/N. This
characterization is used, in the next section, to infer the distribution of transfers and the
probability of provision of the public good.
Let F∗ denote the equilibrium distribution of transfers. Clearly, F∗ is continuous.5 Let
H∗ (x) denote the equilibrium probability of winning a voter with an oﬀer of x. In equilibrium,
candidates may promise the public good with positive probability, so H∗ incorporates this
probability; in particular, H∗ (x) is discontinuous at x = G if the public good is oﬀered with
positive probability. For the moment, assume that the min of the support of H∗ is zero, and
the max is N (this will be proved below). We now show that H∗ (x) = x/N whenever x
belongs to the support of F∗ (and x 6= G), and H∗ (x) ≤ x/N otherwise.
Candidate 1’s problem is to choose a c.d.f F to maximize his expected vote share subject
to the budget constraint. If the candidate oﬀers x to a voter, the probability of winning
his vote is H∗ (x); if the candidate chooses oﬀers according to F, his expected vote share is
R





H∗ (x)dF (x) s.t.
Z N
0
xdF (x) ≤ 1.




[H∗ (x) + λ(1 − x)]dF (x).
Let A denote the support of F∗. Since F∗ maximizes the Lagrangean, it must be that
H∗ (x) − λ∗xis maximal, and constant, on A. Since 0 is the inf of A, it must be that
const = H∗ (0)−λ∗·0 = 0. Since N is the sup of A, we have 0 = H∗ (N)−λ∗·N = 1−Nλ∗.
This shows that λ∗ = 1/N. Thus, H∗ (x) = x/N for x in A. Since H∗ (x) − λ∗xis maximal,
and equal to zero, on A, we have H∗ (x) − x/N ≤ 0 outside of A.
We now verify that the minimum of the support of H∗ is zero, and the maximum is
N. Suppose that the minimum of A is m > 0. Because of the budget constraint, m < G;
therefore, because F∗ is continuous, the probability of winning a vote by oﬀering m equals
zero. But then a candidate is paying m to obtain zero votes, which cannot be optimal.
Denote with M the maximum of A. At equilibrium, M has to equal N. Indeed, suppose
it was smaller than N. Then, a player could deviate and give N −ε to more than 1/N of the
5Suppose F is discontinuous at b x. Then, a fraction p > 0 of voters are oﬀered b x. But this cannot be
optimal. Candidate 1 gains by oﬀering slightly more than b x to p − ε of these voters, ﬁnancing this deviation
by oﬀering zero to the remaining ε. This deviation proﬁtably breaks the tie at b x.
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voters. This guarantees a vote share larger than 1/N, contradicting equilibrium. Suppose
then that M was larger than N. Because zero and M are in the support of F, one optimal
strategy is to oﬀer close to M to 1/M of the electorate, and zero to the rest. However, this
strategy yields a vote share smaller than 1/N if M is greater than N. Thus, M = N.
Finally, we show that the support of F is the union of two intervals, [0,k] and [G,N], for
some positive k < G. In other words, we show that the only interval where F can be ﬂat
is [k,G]. Suppose that there is an interval (a,b) such that F(b) − F(a) = 0, F(G) > F(b),
and such that a and b are in the support of F. This means that the probability of obtaining
a vote by oﬀering b is the same as by oﬀering a. However, oﬀering b is more costly. Thus,
oﬀering b cannot be optimal. A similar logic applies to the interval [G,N].
4 Equilibrium With Equal Treatment
Let us ﬁrst consider the game of pure redistribution. Myerson (1993) proves the following
result.6
Theorem 1 (Myerson) If G < 1 there is a unique equilibrium with equal treatment. The
public good is not provided, and candidates choose transfers according to the distribution F∗
6Myerson proves a more general result that treats the case of many candidates and any rank-scoring rule.




N−1 for x in [0,N].
Sketch of Proof The probability of winning a vote with an oﬀer of x is H∗(x) = [F∗(x)]N−1.
We showed in Section 3 that H∗(x) = x/N.
We now consider the case where G > 1. In this case the public good must be provided
with positive probability in equilibrium. To see this, suppose that candidates 2,...,N behave
according to the equilibrium described in Theorem 1. Then, if candidate 1 oﬀers the public
good, he receives a share of the vote of G/N > 1 for G > 1. Furthermore, if G < N there is
no equilibrium where the public good is provided with probability one; if all candidates oﬀer
the public good, oﬀering transfers above G to more than one Nth of the voters is feasible
and is a proﬁtable deviation. Thus, in the region where 1 < G < N, candidates randomize
between promising transfers and oﬀering the public good.
Theorem 2 There is a unique equilibrium with equal treatment. For 1 < G < N, the
equilibrium is characterized by a probability β of providing the public good and a distribution of




























N−1. The probability β is increasing in G. For G > N the public
good is provided with probability one.
Proof: Equilibrium requires that if a candidate oﬀers transfers, he cannot do better than by
choosing F∗. This requires that H∗ (x) = x/N on [0,k]∪[G,N] (see the discussion in Section













and the strict inequality holds only if F has a larger support than F∗. In particular, the
payoﬀ equals 1/N when F = F∗.
Now, let us turn our knowledge of H∗ into a characterization of F∗. The probability of
winning a vote with an oﬀer of x in [0,k] is
H∗ (x) = [(1 − β)F∗ (x)]
N−1 .









for x ∈ (0,k). (1)








((1 − β)F∗ (x))
j βN−1−j
= [(1 − β)F∗ (x) + β]
N−1 .











for x ∈ (G,N). (2)
To complete the characterization of F∗ we look for conditions to pin down β and k. The
ﬁrst condition is given by the continuity of F∗, which requires F∗ (k) = F∗ (G). Substituting


















G xf (x)dx = 1.


















































































Equations (3) and (4) form a system of two equations in the unknowns k and β.





















































is single-peaked on [0,∞), has a maximum at z = 1,
and has value zero at z = 0 and z = N. Because h is single peaked, equation (5) only has
two solutions: one is k = G; the other is k∗ (G) = h−1 (G), where h−1 denote the inverse
of h on the interval [0,1]. Only the second solution can be part of an equilibrium, since
the ﬁrst solution requires that β equals zero, and this is impossible when 1 < G < N.
Solving for β is accomplished by substituting k∗ (G) into equation (3), to obtain β∗ (G).
Observe that k∗ (G) is decreasing in G since h is increasing on (0,1); therefore, β∗ (G) =
(G/N)
1
N−1 − (k∗ (G)/N)
1
N−1 is increasing in G.
To verify that the pair β∗ (G) and k∗ (G) indeed forms an equilibrium, we need to check





























/pN, we rewrite the above
equation as
[(1 − β)F∗ (G) + β]







Since F∗ (G) = F∗ (k) we can rewrite this as
[(1 − β)F∗ (G) + β]























This equation is the same as equation (4). Thus, when β = β∗ (G),k = k∗ (G), it is indeed
the case that SG = 1/N. This shows that the pair β∗ (G),k∗ (G) forms an equilibrium.
Uniqueness follows from the discussion in Section 3 together with the uniqueness of the
solutions of β and k.
The following table presents the equilibrium values of β for diﬀerent pairs G,N. For given
value of G, β declines with N.
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G
2 3 4 5 6
1.5 .5 .27 .19 .15 .12
2 1 .52 .36 .28 .23
2.5 1 .76 .52 .40 .33
3 1 1 .68 .52 .43
3.5 1 1 .84 .64 .52
4 1 1 1 .76 .61
4.5 1 1 1 .88 .71
5 1 1 1 1 .80
5.5 1 1 1 1 .90
The following ﬁgure presents the density f∗ (x) for the cases of G = 1.5 and N = 3 (the
thin line) and N = 4 (the boldface line). Promises between x = 7.9382×10−2 and 3 are less
likely with N = 4 than with N = 3. Thus, redistributional platforms become more unequal
as N goes from 3 to 4.
5 The Costs of Ideology
We now introduce the possibility that some voters have ideological biases in favor of one of
the candidates. First, we address redistributional issues: we show that partisan voters tend
to be disadvantaged in the process of redistributive politics (Theorem 3). This is because
partisan voters are less responsive to transfers, and so competition for those voters is less
intense. We present the results for the model with three candidates, to show that the logic
of Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) also applies to a model with more than two candidates. A
similar result can be derived in the case with two candidates.
13Next, we show that ideological biases are a source of ineﬃciency in our model (Theorem
4). The fact that electoral competition focuses on swing voters, creates an even stronger
incentive for candidates to oﬀer redistributive platforms targeted to these voters, instead of
a public good whose services beneﬁt swing voters and partisan voters equally. This leads to
lower provision of the public good, relative to the case where voters have no ideological bias.
There are N + 1 groups of voters: VS,V1,...,VN, where VS is of size 1 − ϕ, and each Vi
is of size ϕ/N for i = 1,...,N. Voters in Vi are partisan for candidate i: with probability
p they vote ideologically, i.e., they ignore electoral promises and vote for candidate i; with
probability 1−p they vote for the candidate who makes the higher promise. Voters in VS are
swing voters: they have no ideological preference, they always vote for the candidate making
the higher promise.
This way of modeling ideology allows for the possibility that there is another dimension
of the policy space (such as war and peace, abortion rights ...), the various candidates
have distinct positions on this policy issue, and that some voters have stronger preferences
than others on this issue. The model can be readily extended to treat several degrees of
partisanship by allowing for groups with diﬀerent probabilities pi of voting ideologically.
Theorem 3 Assume that, for each of the three candidates, there is a fraction ϕ/N of parti-
san voters who with probability p vote ideologically; the remaining (1 − ϕ) are swing voters.
Assume further that G(1 − ϕ) < 1. Then, the following is an equilibrium. Each candidate
chooses transfers according to a pair of distributions: oﬀers to partisan voters are drawn
from the distribution F∗
























N−1 must be uniform on [0,KS]and [0,KP],
respectively (see the discussion in Section 3). We use the equation [F∗
S (x)]




















It remains to solve for KS and KP. To this end, we ﬁrst note that candidates must receive
the same expected return from oﬀering x to swing and partisan voters, hence
[F∗
S (x)]
N−1 = (1 − p)[F∗
P (x)]
N−1 .
Substituting from equations (7) and (8) we rewrite the above equation as
KP
KS
= (1 − p). (9)









P (x) = 1,




















Solving the integrals and simplifying we get
1
N
(1 − ϕ)KS +
1
N
ϕKP = 1. (10)




In the next theorem we show that the ineﬃciency in our model is proportional to the
fraction of partisan voters in the electorate. To this end, we make the simplifying assumption
that partisan voters are completely unresponsive to electoral promises, i.e., p = 1. We are
then able to show that, when a fraction ϕ of the electorate is partisan, the probability of
public good provision corresponds to the probability in a model where no voter is partisan,
and the public good has value G(1 − ϕ). Thus, the probability that the public good is
provided is decreasing in the degree of polarization of the electorate.
The intuition is the following: when there are ϕ partisan voters and p = 1, at equilib-
rium partisans receive zero transfers, thus freeing up resources for candidates to compete for
swing voters. Then, candidates can allocate transfers of 1/(1 − ϕ) per swing voter. This is
more money per capita than was available in the case of no partisans. Normalizing the per
capita money to 1 requires normalizing the value of the public good to G(1 − ϕ). After this
normalization, the equilibrium can be derived from Theorem 2.
Theorem 4 Assume that, for each of the three candidates, there is a fraction ϕ/N of partisan
voters who with probability p = 1 vote ideologically; the remaining (1 − ϕ) are swing voters.
Then, the following is an equilibrium. Partisan voters never receive any trasnfers. For
1 < G(1 − ϕ) < N, the equilibrium is characterized by a probability β of providing the
public good and a distribution of transfers F∗































N−1. For G(1 − ϕ) > N the public good is provided with probability one.
Proof: See Appendix.
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6 The Ineﬃciency of Fragmented Competition
This section deals with equilibria with fragmented competition. We show that there are
equilibria where a candidate treats diﬀerent voters diﬀerently, by concentrating the beneﬁts
of redistribution on a subset of the electorate which we call his support base. The ineﬃciency of
the electoral process becomes more pronounced relative to the case of equal treatment covered
in Section 4. The reason is that now the value of targeting is even greater, since candidates
want to be able to focus their promises on a pre-speciﬁed subsection of the population.
For expositional purposes, it is useful to think of voters being distributed uniformly on
a circle with perimeter equal to one. As before, candidate i chooses to promise the public
good with probability βi and promise money with probability 1 − βi. Now, in the event of
promising money, the candidate partitions the set of voters into two groups: one where voters
get nothing (they are fully expropriated), the other where their oﬀers are drawn from the
same c.d.f. Fi : < → [0,1]. We call the second group of voters the support base of candidate
i.
As in Section 4, we start with a discussion of the case where the public good is provided
with probability zero. In contrast with the previous analysis, the values of G for which this
happens is now larger.




. Then there is an equilibrium where candidate 1 has
support base from 5 to 1 o’clock (clockwise). Candidate 2 has support base from 9 to 5 o’clock.
Candidate 3 has support base from 1 to 9 o’clock. All candidates draw oﬀers to voters in their
support base from a uniform distribution on [0,3].
16Proof: Denote with F∗ (x) the c.d.f. of a random variable distributed as a Uniform on
[0,3]. At the proposed strategy combination, each candidate’s share of the vote equals 1/3.
Suppose candidate 1 deviates and oﬀers the public good.
For each voter in his support base (from 5 to 1), candidate 1 is only competing with one
other candidate who oﬀers transfers with c.d.f. F∗ (x) = x/3. Therefore, the probability of
winning a voter in the support base is G/3. For a voter outside the support base of candidate
1, the candidate competes with both opponents, leading to a lower probability (G/3)
2 of












Setting S(F∗,F∗;G) = 1




. Since S(F∗,F∗;G) is increasing in G, we
have S(G) ≤ 1




. In this parameter range, deviating to oﬀering the public
good does not pay.
Suppose that candidate 1 deviates and chooses an alternative distribution of transfers.
First, suppose that candidate 1 considers changing his support base, i.e., he oﬀers positive
amounts to voters between 1 and 5 o’clock. Take any particular voter in this set and suppose
he oﬀers the voter x. Then the probability of getting his vote is (F∗(x))2, since the oﬀer has
to be higher than the equilibrium oﬀer by both other candidates. On the other hand, the
probability of getting the vote of a voter in the support base is F∗(x) ≥ (F∗(x))2. Thus, for
candidate 1, oﬀering transfer outside his support base is dominated by oﬀering transfers to
voters inside his support base.
Now, suppose candidate 1 sticks to oﬀering transfers only to his support base, but uses

















where the inequality comes from the fact that F∗(x) = x
3 on [0,3] and F∗(x) = 1 < x
3 for
x > 3; the last equality comes from the budget constraint. This shows that there is no beneﬁt
to deviating to a diﬀerent distribution of transfers.
Remark: There is an interesting contrast between Theorem 5 and the equilibrium de-
scribed by Myerson (1993) (Theorem 1 above). In that equilbrium, in contrast with the
equilibrium described in Theorem 5, all voters get the same amount from all candidates in
expectation.
We now discuss the case where the public good is provided with positive probability. As
in Section 4, when G < 3 there is no equilibrium where the public good is provided with
probability one.




< G < 3. Then there is an equilibrium where candidate 1
has support base from 5 to 1 o’clock (clockwise). Candidate 2 has support base from 9 to 5
o’clock. Candidate 3 has support base from 1 to 9 o’clock. The probability β that the public
good is provided is monotonically increasing in G and is characterized by the system (11).
When G ≥ 3 the public good is provided with probability one.
Proof: We guess that the equilibrium distribution of transfers F∗ has a particular form: F∗
increases linearly with slope γ1 between 0 and k, with slope γ2 between Gand K, and is
constant elsewhere. Thus, K > G denotes the maximum transfer oﬀered by a candidate, and
k < G denotes the maximum transfer below G.
We can eliminate k and K. Indeed, denote q = 1 − F∗ (G); using the deﬁnition of F∗, it
must be k =
1−q
γ1 and K =
q
γ2 + G. A further restriction on the parameters comes from the
budget constraint
R ∞
0 xdF∗ (x) = 3/2. Since
R ∞
0 xdF∗ (x) =
R ∞
0 [1 − F∗ (x)]dx, the budget





We want to show that equilibrium is characterized by the following system:

          










3 (1 − q − γ2G)

+ (1 − β)
2 2
3 (1 − q − γ2G) = 0
(1 − β)
2 2
3γ2 + 2β (1 − β) 1


















The third, fourth, and ﬁfth equations in the system come from the discussion above. We
now derive the remaining equations.
At equilibrium, the expected share of the vote from promising money and the public
good must be equal, so that candidates are willing to oﬀer both. To compute the expected
share of the vote, start by considering the event (G,F∗;F∗) where candidate 1 and candidate
3 promise to redistribute according to F∗, and candidate 2 promises the public good. On
half of his support base, candidate 1 competes with candidate 2 alone, and the probability
of winning a vote is q. On the other half of his support base, candidate 1 competes with
both opponents. In that case, to win a vote, candidate 1’s oﬀer must (a) exceed G, which
happens with probability q; AND (b) conditional on being higher than G, candidate 1’s oﬀer
must exceed candidate 2’s oﬀer, which happens whenever 2’s oﬀer is smaller than G (prob.
1 − q), and with probability 1/2 when 2’s oﬀer is larger than G (prob. q), leading to a total
probability of 1−q+(q/2). On the second half of the support base, the probability of winning


















18Proceeding in a similar fashion, we can ﬁll in all the entries in the following table. The table
presents the share of the vote of the player playing the row action when his opponents’ actions
are those written in the columns.
G,G G,F∗ F∗,G F∗,F∗
G 1/3 2
6 (1 − q) + 1
6
2
6 (1 − q) + 1
6
1
3 (1 − q)
2 + 2

















From this table we can recover the expected share of the vote when oﬀering the public
good,



























Similarly, the expected share of the vote when oﬀering transfers according to F∗ is
























In equilibrium, candidates randomize between oﬀering the public good and transfers. Thus,
the expected share of the vote of a candidate who oﬀers the public good and money must be
equal,
ESG = ESF∗. (13)
Using the fact that S (G,G;F∗) = 1 − 2S (G,F∗;G) and S (F∗,F∗;G) = 1 − 2S (G,F∗;F∗),
after some algebra one obtains
ESG = ESF∗ + 2β












Thus, equality of expected shares (equation (13)) is equivalent to
2β












Substituting for S (G,F∗;G) and S (G,F∗;F∗), and solving for β, yields
β =
2 − 4q + q2
(q − 1)
2 . (14)
This is the last equation of system (11). When this equation is veriﬁed, candidates are
indiﬀerent between promising the public good and the equilibrium distribution of transfers.
Let us now consider deviations to diﬀerent distributions of transfers.
19The share of the vote of a candidate who redistributes according to F, when the other














[γ1M1 + γ2M2 + (1 − q − γ2G)(1 − F (G))].
where M1 =
R k
0 xdF (x) and M2 =
R K
G xdF (x), whence by the budget constraint M1 +M2 =
3
2.
The share of the vote of a candidate who redistributes according to F, when the one of
his opponents redistributes according to the equilibrium distribution F∗, and the other oﬀers













(1 − F (G)) +
1
3
[γ2M2 + (1 − q − γ2G)(1 − F (G))]
Finally, the share of the vote of a candidate who redistributes according to F when the other
two candidates oﬀer the public good is
2
3
(1 − F (G)).
Thus, the expected share of the vote when redistributing according to F and the opponents










(1 − F (G)) +
1
3







(γ1M1 + γ2M2 + (1 − q − γ2G)(1 − F (G)))

(15)
Expression (15) depends on F through F (G),M1, and M2. The candidate should not














(1 − q − γ2G)

+ (1 − β)
2 2
3
(1 − q − γ2G) = 0.
Furthermore, the candidate should not be able to improve his lot by changing the allocation
of his expenditures between M1 and M2, given the constraint that M1+M2 = 3/2. Thus, the





γ1 = (1 − β)
2 2
3




20The last two equations complete the system (11).




γ2 = − 1
−3+Gρ
k = 1






q = ρ where ρ is a root of (G + 3)Z2 + (−2G + 3)Z − 3 + G.
The following table reports a numerical calculation of the equilibrium values of all the
variables.
G β k K γ1 γ2 q
1.3 2.9637 × 10−2 1.175 2 3.0 .35401 .34351 .58397
1.4 8.1605 × 10−2 1.060 9 3.0 .3952 .36295 .58072
1.5 .133 97 .95096 3.0 .44444 .3849 .57735
1.6 .18677 .8455 3.0 .50403 .40989 .57384
1.7 .24003 .74471 3.0 .57714 .43861 .5702
1.8 .29377 .64879 3.0 .66833 .47199 .56639
1.9 .34805 .55797 3.0 .78425 .51129 .56242
2.0 .4029 .47247 3.0 .93495 .55826 .55826
2.5 .68782 .13626 3.0 3.4207 1.0678 .53391
2.8 .87286 2.4352 × 10−2 3.0 19.908 2.576 .51521
2.9 .93438 6.3822 × 10−3 3.0 77. 402 5. 0794 . 50794
In this equilibrium with fragmented competition, the probability of provision of the public
good is uniformly lower than in the case with equal treatment. The interpretation is that,
when political rivals tailor their platforms to subgroups of the population, a politician has
greater incentive to target promises narrowly to his own supporters. Promising the public
good is therefore less proﬁtable, relative to the case where all politicians appeal to a broader
fraction of the electorate.
Observe that the ineﬃciency resulting from coordination requires more than two candi-
dates; thus, this is a diﬀerent phenomenon from the one that emerged in our analysis of
ideology (Section 5), which is present even with just two candidates. Furthermore, in the
equilibrium of Section 5 partisan voters expect lower transfers (ex ante) than swing voters;
in contrast, voters’ expected transfers are the same in the equilibrium of Theorems 5 and 6.
217 Implications
7.1 Contrast with winner-take-all with two candidates
In a winner-take-all system, candidates maximize the probability of winning the election and
not the expected vote share. This would be the case in a system with a strong majoritarian
bias, where most of the powers of policy setting are delegated to the party with a majority
of votes, and where minority parties do not have much inﬂuence. A winner-take-all system
of electoral incentives also prevails in the direct election of a premier, where the candidate
with the highest number of votes receives all the spoils of oﬃce.
Duverger’s Law suggests that majoritarian systems should be associated with only two
competing parties. The argument is that voters should coordinate on the two candidates
most likely to be elected, and avoid wasting their vote on other candidates. A corollary
of Duverger’s Law, largely borne out in reality, is that proportional systems have a larger
number of eﬀective political parties. We compare the results in Section 4 to the equilibrium
in a two-candidates election with a winner-take-all rule.
Austen-Smith and Banks (1988) compare the equilibrium in a proportional system with
three candidates with the equilibrium of a winner-take-all system with two candidates. They
analyze proportional representation in a three-candidate model of spatial competition that
integrates the electoral and legislative processes. Under plurality rule, both candidates adopt
the policy preferred by the median voter. Under proportional representation the equilibrium
electoral platforms are symmetrically distributed around the median. The government is
formed between the party that adopts the median position (which receives the fewest votes)
and one of the other parties. The policy outcome that emerges from the legislative process
is a compromise between the platforms of these two parties and is diﬀerent from the median
voter’s preferred policy. The possibility of using their analysis for a discussion of eﬃciency is
limited by their use of the spatial model.
In our model, the comparison rests on the following theorem, proved in Lizzeri and Persico
(1998).
Theorem 7 Suppose 1 < G < 2, and N = 2. Under the winner-take-all system in the
unique equilibrium both candidates oﬀer the public good with probability 1/2 for G ∈ (1,2).
Candidates oﬀer the public good with probability 0 if G < 1 and with probability one if G > 2.
Comparing this equilibrium with the analysis in Section 4 shows that the proportional
system is generally more ineﬃcient than a winner-take-all system. The probability of public
good provision is larger in the winner-take-all system relative to the equilibrium with equal
treatment in the proportional system, unless N = 2 and G < 3/2, or N = 3 and G is between
1.963 and 2. (The equilibrium with fragmented competition of Section 6 is always less eﬃcient
22than the winner-take-all system). This suggests that two-candidate elections lead to more
eﬃcient outcomes.
If we believe Duverger’s Law, this observation would be an argument in favor of winner-
take-all systems, which increase eﬃciency by reducing the number of competing parties.
7.2 The Size of Government (PRELIMINARY)
We deﬁne the size of government as the total amount of taxes levied. Recall that we can
think of our model as applying to an economy where voters have an endowment of one unit
of money, and candidates need to tax voters if they want to provide the public good or to
oﬀer transfers to other voters. Thus, the size of government is maximal if the public good
is provided since voters are taxed the full amount. If a candidate provides transfers, we
can compute the size of taxes from the equilibrium distribution of transfers F∗ by observing
that the support of F∗ is a translation of the support of the equilibrium distribution if we
incorporate taxes. Thus, the size of government in that case is given by 1 −
R 1
0 xdF∗(x).
The eﬀect of the number of candidates on the size of government is aﬀected by two
contrasting forces. First, as we saw in Section 4, as the number of candidates increases, the
probability that the public good is provided decreases. Thus, this eﬀect is in the direction
of lower size of government as the number of candidates increases. Second, the distribution
of transfers changes. It can be shown that in the event that transfers are oﬀered, the total
size of taxes increases with the number of candidates. It is easy to see that the ﬁrst eﬀect is
going to dominate when the value of the public good is large whereas the second is going to
dominate when the value of the public good is close to one.
7.3 Other models of ideology
Lindbeck and Weibull’s (1987) treatment of redistributive politics cannot logically be sepa-
rated from the role of ideology. This is because ideology is essential for the existence of the
pure strategy equilibria that they focus on; this requires making assumptions on ideology that
are necessary for technical reasons. An advantage of our model is that the analysis of ideology
can be logically separated from the basic model of redistributive politics. Furthermore, if we
introduce a public good in the Lindbeck-Weibull model, there is an eﬃcient equilibrium if
groups are homogeneous (see the appendix for a proof of this). The reason for this is the
following. The equilibrium outcome of the Lindbeck-Weibull model involves groups with the
same characteristics receiving the same promises. Thus, the tradeoﬀ between targetability
and eﬃciency disappears when groups are homogeneous. It seems to us that this negates
an important aspect of redistributive politics since the incentives to target subgroups of the
populations to obtain their votes does not seem to depend exclusively on diﬀerences between
groups.
238 Conclusion
We have provided a model of N-candidate competition where candidates choose whether to
oﬀer to provide a public good or to target transfers to sub-groups of the population. We
have shown that in equilibrium the probability that the public good is provided decreases
with the number of candidates. Then we discussed the role of ideology in voters’ preferences
and showed that the larger the group of pre-committed voters, the less eﬃcient the political
process in terms of provision of public goods. Finally, we discussed an equilibrium with
fragmented competition where the probability of provision of the public good is uniformly
lower than in the case with equal treatment. The interpretation is that, when political rivals
tailor their platforms to subgroups of the population, a politician has greater incentive to
target promises narrowly to his own supporters. Promising the public good is therefore
less proﬁtable, relative to the case where all politicians appeal to a broader fraction of the
electorate.
249 Appendix
9.1 Proof of Theorem 4.
Proof: Since partisan voters get no money in equilibrium, we now focus on swing voters. By
the same argument as in the proof of Theorem 2, equilibrium requires that if a candidate oﬀers
transfers, he cannot do better than by choosing F∗. This requires that H∗ (x) = x(1−ϕ)/N
on [0,w] ∪ [G,N/(1 − ϕ)].
The probability of winning a vote with an oﬀer of x in [0,w] is
H∗ (x) = [(1 − β)F∗ (x)]
N−1 .









for x ∈ (0,w). (16)








((1 − β)F∗ (x))
j βN−1−j
= [(1 − β)F∗ (x) + β]
N−1 .













 for x ∈ (G,N/(1 − ϕ)). (17)
To complete the characterization of F∗ we look for conditions to pin down β and w. The
ﬁrst condition is given by the continuity of F∗, which requires F∗ (w) = F∗ (G). Substituting



















G xf (x)dx =

































































































Equations (18) and (19) form a system of two equations in the unknowns w and β.






















































is single-peaked on [0,∞), has a maximum at z = 1,
and has value zero at z = 0 and z = N. Because h is single peaked, equation (20) only has
two solutions: one is w = G; the other is w∗ (G) = h−1 (G), where h−1 denote the inverse
of h on the interval [0,1]. Only the second solution can be part of an equilibrium, since the
second solution requires that β equals zero, and this is impossible when 1 < G(1 − ϕ) < N.
Solving for β is accomplished by substituting w∗ (G) into equation (18), to obtain β∗ (G).
Observe that w∗ (G) is decreasing in G since h is increasing on (0,1); therefore, β∗ (G) =
(G(1 − ϕ)/N)
1
N−1 − ((1 − ϕ)w∗ (G)/N)
1
N−1 is increasing in G.
To verify that the pair β∗ (G) and w∗ (G) indeed forms an equilibrium, we need to check





























/pN, we rewrite the above
equation as
[(1 − β)F∗ (G) + β]







Since F∗ (G) = F∗ (w) we can rewrite this as
[(1 − β)F∗ (G) + β]























This equation is the same as equation (19). Thus, when β = β∗ (G),w = w∗ (G), it is indeed
the case that SG = 1/N. This shows that the pair β∗ (G),w∗ (G) forms an equilibrium.
Uniqueness follows from the discussion in Section 3 together with the uniqueness of the
solutions of β and w.
9.2 “Lindbeck-Weibull” Model with Homogeneous Voters (PRELIMINARY)
There is a continuum of identical voters. There are two goods, money and a public good.
Each voter has an endowment of one unit of money. The public good can only be produced
by using all the money in the economy. The public good is perceived as G units of money by
each voter. Voters’ preferences are represented by a utility function U, which is assumed to
be strictly increasing and concave.
There are three candidates, indexed by i. Candidates make binding promises to each
voter. A candidate can oﬀer to provide the public good (to all voters); alternatively, he can
oﬀer diﬀerent taxes and transfers to diﬀerent voters. Each voter votes for the candidate who
promises her the greatest utility. Voters have no a priori preference for either candidate.
Voters also care about ideology. For each voter v, let yi denote the realization of a random
variable Yi with distribution H. Suppose voter v with ideological preference (y1,y2,y3) is
promised consumption (c1,c2,c3). Then this voter will vote for candidate 1 if
U (c1) + y1 > max{U (c2) + y2,U (c3) + y3}
The probability that this voter votes for candidate 1 is
Pr(U (c1) + Y1 > max{U (c2) + Y2,U (c3) + Y3}).
Let cv
i denote the consumption oﬀered to voter v by candidate i, and Y v
i denote the ideological
preference of voter v for candidate i. Assume that Y v
i and Y v0
i are i.i.d. for v 6= v0. Candidate




1) + Y v
1 > max{U (cv
2) + Y v
2 ,U (cv
3) + Y v
3 })dv.
Proposition 8 If U is suﬃciently concave, there is an eﬃcient equilibrium in pure strategies
where the public good is provided if G > 1.
27Proof: Suppose candidates 2 and 3 promise the public good. Let us consider the beneﬁts





1) + Y v
1 > max{U (G) + Y v
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where e H denotes the c.d.f. of the random variable max{Y v
2 ,Y v
3 } − Y v
1 . If U is suﬃciently
concave, the ﬁrst-order conditions characterize optimality for the schedule {cv
1}. Since the
ﬁrst-order conditions do not depend on v, the optimal schedule gives the same amount to
each voter, cv
1 = 1 for all v. If G > 1 candidate one is better oﬀ promising the public good.
We now show that it is possible to construct examples where there is an equilibrium where
the public good is underprovided in the electoral equilibrium.
Example
Suppose Yi is uniform on [−10,10]. Suppose U (c) = 100c. There is a ˆ G > 1 such that for
all G < b G the following is an equilibrium: No candidate oﬀers to provide the public good.
Candidate 1 oﬀers 3/2 to voters from 5 to 1 o’clock and zero to others, candidate 2 oﬀers 3/2
to voters from 9 to 5 o’clock and zero to others, and candidate 3 gives 3/2 to voters from 1
to 9 o’clock and zero to others.
Proof: Similar logic to Theorem 5. Details to be ﬁnished.
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